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Worlds Upset: Identity Conflicts after Socialism 
with Special Regard to Sub-Carpathia
“In East-Central Europe eveiyday offers a new adventure, and if 
one goes through the experience with an open mind, he will have to 
admit he is lucky.”
Gyorgy Csepeli
In view of the subject-matter (Totalitarian Systems and the East-European Church­
es) of the 20li'-century section of the conference, the above title, “Worlds Upset”, sums 
up my thoughts as a scholar of society. The conflict the section chose to study will 
certainly provide enough material for investigation for many decades to come. And in 
this respect we ought to think not only of the period under totalitarian regimes, but 
also of old problems that have recently surfaced as apparently new ones, after the many 
years of oppression.
Global changes have mobilised forces in East-Central Europe deemed by both 
Eastern and Western observers not to exist anymore. National feelings emerged anew 
with immense force. The several decades of experiments with replacing it by interna­
tionalist propaganda have proved a failure. In this national renewal, which, it must be 
stressed, is not by principle a negative process, religion has played a significant role.
In what follows I shall analyse the fieldwork I carried out in the ethnically varied 
Sub-Carpathia. The subject of my investigation is a conflict; the origins and evolvement 
of which I wish to survey. However, I cannot and do not wish to do justice in any form 
whatsoever, because I do not think justice exists in such situations. I find these conflicts 
interesting because they afford an understanding of social processes and necessities.
The Hungarian name of the territory, Kdrpatalja (Sub-Carpathia), refers to the 
southern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains. Today the territory belongs to Ukraine 
and is called “Trans-Carpathian Region” Zakarpats’ka oblast. It is surrounded by 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and the Carpathian Mountains. It is neither a historical 
nor a geographical region. It emerged as a result of the dissolution of Austro-Hungar­
ian Monarchy in 1918. With this name and with these artificial borders (splitting up 
linguistic and ethnic boundaries and counties that had been formed historically much
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earlier) it is a political region. Until 1918 it belonged to the historical Hungary, between 
1918 and 1938 to Czechoslovakia, during World War II to Hungary and afterwards it 
was incorporated into the Soviet Union. Today it is part of Ukraine (see map)1.
By way of introduction, I should like to emphasise that what I am going to discuss is 
not a conflict between two nationalities. The subject of my investigation is strife among 
Hungarians. Ethnic and religious identities usually support one another. The case to be 
considered seems at first sight to prove that this is not an immutable law: I am going to 
elaborate on a conflict between religious and ethnic identities within one ethnic group.
THE UNG-REGION AND THE STUDIED SETTLEMENTS IN THE SUB-CARPATHIA
1 Magocsi regards the territory as belonging toTranscarpathia. We define it as a political region, while 
Magocsi in attempting to define the Ruthenian ethnic group uses the name because of the Lemkos living 
north of the Carpathian Ridge. See Magocsi, Paul Robert: The Birth o f a New Nation Or the Return of an 
Old Problem ? The Rusyns o f East Central Europe. Forthcoming in Acta Ethnographica, Budapest.
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According to the late 18lh-century censuses, 25-40 per cent of the population of these 
villages were Ruthenian Greek Catholics. However, by 1806 Ruthenians were assimilat­
ed to Hungarians to such an extent that in certain settlements and with respect to lan­
guages used for preaching, Ruthenian became second to Hungarian. At the turn of the 
century, the population of these same villages was entirely Hungarian, and remained so 
even in the 1941 census. Though the villagers in question assimilated completely with 
Hungarians, they remained faithful to their Greek Catholic creed. Their assimilation was 
accelerated by the fact that in every settlement of the region they were in a minority po­
sition. Furthermore, Hungarians, being economically superior, could exert powerful in­
fluence upon them. Besides their “Hungarisation”, Greek Catholics also went through 
the process called “Latinisation”, both their domestic culture and cults were adjusted to 
those of Roman Catholics. Thus by the middle of the 19lh century the “other”, the “alien”, 
and, to use local idiom, the “mountaineers” and the Tots1 disappeared from these villag­
es, which thus became ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogeneous.
In the studied settlements (see map), the Reformed populace constituted the reli­
gious majority, the number of Roman and Greek Catholics was roughly the same, howev­
er, only the Greek Catholics possessed a church of their own in all the three villages 
(e.g. Galocs, Palagykomoroc, Sisloc) examined, with one priest residing in one of 
them. On top of it all, the Roman Catholics lost their parish as it was annexed to 
Slovakia in 1945.
After World War II the functioning of the Churches was severely constrained in 
Ukraine and Sub-Carpathia, both belonging at the time to the Soviet Union. The au­
thorities struck down upon the Greek Catholic Church most harshly: it was reunited 
with the Russian Orthodox Church at the Council of Lviv in 1946, presided over by the 
secret police3. Greek Catholic ministers and communities were thus given a chance to 
practice religion, but only within the bounds of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
according to its rite. Priests not conforming to that rule were all deported4. The Hun­
garian speaking Greek Catholics naturally did not opt for the Orthodox rite in Slavic. 
The Russian Orthodox rite was not attractive for them, as it was for many Ruthenian 
communities, since it was in a language completely, or almost completely alien to them. 
Thus the first church was turned into a training hall, the second one was closed down, 
then transformed into a museum never to be visited by anyone, and the third one be­
came the gymnasium of a nearby school.
The Roman Catholics of all three villages were bereft of priest and church alike. 
But the circumstances of the two Catholic Churches were entirely different: even though
3 The word Tot, of unknown, possibly Celtic or Thracian-lllyrian origin, generally means "Slovak” 
and has a pejorative connotation.
3 Himka, John-Paul, The Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nation in Galicia,, in: J. Niessen 
(ed.), Religious Compromise, Political Salvation. The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-building in 
Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh 1993), pp. 1-21.; p. 18. Bociurkiv Bohdan R. The Uniate Church in the Soviet 
Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy, “Canadian Slavonic Papers” 1965, pp. 89-113. Magocsi 
Paul Robert Religion and identity in the Carpathians, “Cross Currents” Vol. 7., 1988, pp. 87-107.
4 For the martyrs of the Munkacs diocese see: Pekar Athanasius B. "You Shall Be Witnesses Unto 
Me ” Contribution to the Martyrology o f the Byzantine Catholic Church in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Pitts­
burgh 1985), p. 3. For the final days of the Munkacs diocese, see: Salacz Gabor: A magyar katolikus egy- 
haz a szomszedos allamok uralma alatt. [The Hungarian Roman Catholic Church under Neighbour States! 
Munich 1975, p. 9.
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wardenship and membership in local church councils became gradually new sources 
of social prestige in the 1990s and seeking these offices was a natural and primary 
goal of people with a propensity to partake in public life, if they had not achieved 
their aims in the newly elected municipalities or in the leadership of the local schools, 
in other words in the new legitimate organisations. With the further development of 
organisations, the increase in the number of priests and masses occurred, and amidst 
the fractured society of these villages, a new community, organised on a purely vol­
untary basis, the Roman Catholic parish, appeared and its vitality far exceeded that 
of worldly organisations.
In 1991, however, word spread that the Greek Catholic Church existed again, and 
that it could reclaim its former churches, the humiliation of being sheltered could thus 
be terminated5. But the formerly Greek Catholic churches were now administered by 
the evolving Roman Catholic community. From outside, it seemed the changes would 
have no effect on these village communities, as no underground Greek Catholic or­
ganisation had existed, it had no extant community (church council or warden), and. 
as a result of the dissolution of denominational differences, all Catholics, Greeks and 
Romans, saw themselves members of the Roman Catholic Church just undergoing 
reorganisation. Still, it was the authorisation of the Greek Catholic Church that fatally 
divided the village communities. This conflict, as far as I see it, constitutes the symbol­
ical struggle for high-profile positions, or, seen at another angle, the process of the 
homogeneous village community falling apart into several communities of different 
mentalities and interests. The struggle is symbolical because the different “parties” are 
not openly attempting to gain one another’s positions, to question one another’s hon­
esty. Everyone is fighting for the church, for the legitimacy springing from the posses­
sion of the church. Today the most important source of legitimacy and power, indeed, 
the most important resource is the church. The way to reach the legitimacy sources 
leads through the parish community and its leadership. Thus, churchwardens became 
the chief targets of the competing parties. For everyone the others’ churchwarden be­
came the “informer”, the “immoral” one, the “self-appointee”, the “inept” one. It was 
not only believers but to some degree even priests that were involved in the fault-find­
ing, frailty-reciting concerning the wardens as well as one another, even by being taken 
in by clearly malicious rumour.
As it is not my task to do justice to anyone, let us review how each party explains its 
own and the other party’s deeds. This should cast light upon how differently members 
of each community interpret the phenomena, events of their small world, the signifi­
cance of their own and their group’s role. The first local crisis broke out when the Greek 
Catholics of the village Sisloc attempted to take possession of their former church. As 
a result, the Roman Catholics began to build their own church. The new church was 
completed, thus it became a living symbol of community discord. The Greek Catholics 
said they would have been ready to share their church with their Roman Catholic breth­
ren, but they insisted on it being a Greek Catholic church again. Instead, the Roman 
Catholics decided they would rather build their own new church, and the Greek Cath­
olics were thus left to renovate the church by themselves. It is worth mentioning that
5 Though the Greek Catholic Church had been permitted to function again in the Soviet Union al­
ready in 19S9, the problem only surfaced in the villages studied from 1991.
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when the Greek Catholics speak of the time-consuming and painstaking renovation of 
their church, they always bring up the fact that they never received so much help as the 
Roman Catholics did, that the Roman Catholics were, in truth, given a lot from Hun­
gary. The Roman Catholics, on the other hand, have different accounts of the same 
story. They say that the Greeks -  according to them, a handful of old people -  forceful­
ly demanded it back, practically re-occupied it, and did not allow the Roman Catholic 
priest enter the church again. All this, of course, happened when the renovation of the 
church, to which they had significantly contributed, neared completion. The conflict in 
this village has now more or less abated. The construction of the new church has pac­
ified public opinion and clarified what rights people are entitled to and where. The 
Roman Catholics, with the building of their church, assigned themselves a new goal, 
and the new church has come to symbolise their community. They gave up the old and, 
until recently, only and common church, which by now has no import for them any­
more, it does not constitute an element of their local identity.
In the village of Palagykomoroc the church was returned to the Greek Catholic 
Church without any ensuing crisis. However, there is a clearly visible tension with re­
spect to space usage. During one of my field-trips the Roman Catholics were prepar­
ing for Sunday mass, and some of their members moved the altar, used for counterfa­
cial mass, to the centre which had been placed at the side. They themselves find it in­
iquitous to have the altar placed at the side in between Roman Catholic masses. I was 
still present when the Greek Catholic vicar arrived and emphatically warned the removers 
of the altar that in the future this could only be done with his permission. He believed 
this was mere “table-worship”, not the worship of God. I suspect the debate concern­
ing the possession of the church is yet unresolved, as, according to a recent survey, 86 
per cent of all Catholics are Roman and only the remaining 14 per cent are Greek.
The greatest and still unresolved crisis began in the village of Galocs, when the 
churchwarden refused entry to the church for the Greek Catholic minister and his fol­
lowers on the second day of Christmas to hold their first Holy Liturgy. He justified 
himself by saying that the Roman Catholic priest pastoring the village had not notified 
him of this, therefore he could not open the church. The Greek Catholic mass was 
thus held in the cemetery in the late December cold. Today, the church is in the pos­
session of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Greek Catholic community attends 
worship in the very same church and is not preparing to build a new one. The Greek 
Catholics have accepted that the church is presently in the ownership of their Ro­
man Catholic brethren, but in the long run they hope for a more viable solution. The 
image the two groups have created of each other is interesting, too: the Roman Cath­
olics are convinced only a few old people consider themselves Greek Catholics, while 
the Greek Catholics believe only a few people have remained Roman Catholic and 
that the majority attending mass according to Roman rite, out of mere nostalgia, is 
in fact Greek Catholic.
The opinion of the Roman Catholics can be summarised as follows: the majority 
of Greek Catholics in Sub-Carpathia are Ruthenians as far as nationality is concerned. 
Their majority, as a result of fifty years of propaganda and prohibition, consider them­
selves Ukrainians. The meagre Hungarian Greek Catholic populace is not recognised 
by either public opinion nor politics: there being a Greek Catholic church implies to 
them that Ukrainians live there. The Roman Catholics doubt whether the Greek Cath­
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olic diocese of Sub-Carpathia, the Munkacs diocese which is under the direct supervi­
sion of the Holy See (ecclesia sui juris) will be able to maintain its status. They are 
positive that in the long run the will of Lviv will prevail, and the Munkacs diocese will 
lose its independence and be incorporated in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 
organisation6. Thus the fate of the Hungarian Greek Catholic minority will be sealed. 
They will be deemed Ukrainian, and therefore the whole village will be considered 
Ukrainian, as the village church is Greek Catholic. If the church were to be in the 
possession of the weak Greek Catholic community, Ruthenians would soon start to 
attend the church. Just as in the neighbouring village, where the church passed into 
the hands of the Hungarian Greek Catholics and Ruthenians began to appear, and 
though they have yet only asked to have the Gospel read to them in their mother- 
tongue during mass now celebrated in Hungarian, sooner or later the whole mass 
will be held in Ruthenian.
The case of this neighbouring village is important for the Roman Catholics of the 
other villages because they refer to it as warning example. As a matter of fact, of the 
three thoroughly studied villages it was there that most Ruthenians have settled. It is 
an outer parish of a highly “Ukrainised” village called Ordarma. As the majority of the 
villagers is Ruthenian in Ordarma, the Julian calendar is in use there. That is why the 
parish in the village under study, where the majority is Hungarian, also uses the Julian 
calendar. Thus, the Hungarians of the other two studied villages regard the use of 
the Gregorian calendar as a proof of forced “Ukrainisation”. In this outer parish the 
Hungarian Greek Catholics have their holidays together with the alien Ukrainian 
Greek Catholics and not with the familiar Hungarian Roman and Greek Catholics. 
This case is a good example of how the churches can come to be involved in, and 
even cause, ethnic conflicts.
Some of my informants even go as far as to speak of a religious war. We sense 
how much harm the schematic image of politics and public opinion influenced by it 
is creating.
In this respect. I have to focus the reader’s attention on yet another phenomenon. 
A good number of people with a Greek Catholic background think of the role of Greek 
Catholicism in a similar fashion. They explain their adherence to the Roman rite, their 
not returning to the Greek one, by saying that in the past fifty years they have been 
living in the Roman Church, they do not know, nor do they remember, the Greek rite. 
I, however, sense a different, probably deeper reason. Three years ago, while studying 
the historical ethno-demography of Galocs, I came to the conclusion that the ancestors 
of the Greek Catholics had once been Ruthenians and had been assimilated to the Hun­
garians in the course of the 19lh century. My acquaintances in the village told me to forget 
this nonsense, it had nothing to do with the truth, that I should discard what I had writ­
ten. Today I know why it was so embarrassing for them to face this: they do not wish 
accept their past. What motivates their escape from Greek Catholicism -  a Ukrainian
6 In the case of such a change, Elemer Ortutay, Hungarian Greek Catholic priest, gives voice to sim­
ilar fears concerning the curtailment of the rights of non-Ruthenian speaking minorities: "...if we were to 
give up our status, the Hungarian, Romanian and Slovak [i.e. Greek Catholic] believers would necessarily 
be thrust into the background”. Cited by Bottlik Jozsef and Dupka Gyorgy, Magyarlakta kozsegek ezrecleve 
Karputaljun [A Thousand Years of Hungarian Communities in Sub-Carpathia] (Ungvar and Budapest 
1993), p. 49.
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denomination in the public eye -  the endeavour to impede the rebirth of Hungarian Greek 
Catholicism in Sub-Carpathia, and to achieve the full coverage of ethnic and religious 
boundaries (i.e. Greek Catholics are Ukrainians, Reformed Protestants and Roman 
Catholics are Hungarians) is the same. Namely the way public opinion and politics 
conceive of national identity in Ukraine, and, alas, the whole of East Central Europe. 
This mentality considers a change in identity to be almost a sin. On the contrary, if we 
believe in the freedom to change identity, the Ruthenian ancestors of present day Greek 
Catholics in these villages do not license in any form whatsoever the majority nation­
ality to seek Ukrainians in Hungarian Greek Catholics7. It is not the denomination of 
a church but the conscious decisions of people that determine the ethnic composition 
of a settlement8.
In approaching the end of my analysis I have to turn back to a fact I started out 
front, namely that ethnic and religious identities in most cases support each other. At 
first sight, my paper seems to suggest just the contrary, because 1 have reported about 
the conflict of ethnicity and religion. The motives of those who attempt to obstruct the 
rebirth of Hungarian Greek Catholicism can, in fact, be explained by the former and 
seemingly disproved principle. Those fighting against Hungarian Greek Catholicism 
in Sub-Carpathia want to equate religion and ethnicity exactly because they want them 
to support each other, because they do not want local Hungarians, as they say, to "pull 
apart”. Religion, i.e. the preference of “Hungarian [= Western] religions” as opposed 
to the suspect Greek Catholicism, is, in fact, the primary means of preserving an ethnic 
group in this situation9.
The subject-matter of my investigation was a conflict. I have tried to present its 
preconditions, its evolvement and existence as well as how it changed the life of villag­
es, these closed and unified communities.
An important element in the evolvement of the conflict was one of historical and 
political significance and wholly beyond the control of the villagers. Their sole choice 
was the acceptance of the given and the adaptation to the new situation. Naturally, such 
changes can always upset many small worlds.
This conflict arose out of a collision of identities. A community, that thought of 
itself as united and harmonious, in one given significant issue reacts in different ways: 
some of them wish to re-animate their old church, while others think of this wish as 
endangering the whole community and driven by mere nostalgia and individual ambi­
tion. The community is then divided, and the two groups begin to be differentiated by
7 A similar instance of seeking legitimacy by way of “searching out ancestors” is given by the mayor 
of Kolozsvar, Georghe Funar, considered an extremist even by many of his compatriots, when he tries to 
make the great Renaissance King, Mathias Corvinus, a Romanian by fixing memorial placards onto his 
birlhhouse with such content.
8 At the end of the last century Geza Petrassevich reported of a similar, though reverse, phenomenon 
concerning the assimilation of the Ruthenians of Budapest: “...why are they ashamed of ...admitting who 
their parents were? ...he who is ashamed of, and denies, his father is not worthy of respect. Still, 78.7 per 
cent of the Greek Catholic intelligentsia does this”. Cited by Mayer Maria, Karpatukran (ruszin) politikai 
es larsadalmi torkevesek 1S60-1910 [Carpatho-Ukrainian (Ruthenian) Politcial and Social Endeavours] 
(Budapest 1977), p. 146.
9 Gans Herbert J., Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: towards a comparison o f ethnic and 
religious acculturation, “Ethnic and racial studies" Vol. 17., 1999, pp. 577-592, 589.
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their norms too, they almost begin to behave as though they were enemies, occasion­
ally even fist law being used to convince dissenters.
Such dissent might have existed in the former decades, but the issue itself did not. 
Only a change of historical significance could actualise the difference in opinion, a 
change that forced everyone to re-define his or her own position. Formerly important 
and prestigious elements of identity either disappeared or became causes of negative 
discrimination (e.g. party membership) and formerly branded public roles (churchwar- 
denship) and conditions (church membership) now acquired valuable elements of iden­
tity for everyone.
Besides creating their own structure, the communities begin activities with which 
they can indicate their having established themselves. They constructed or renovated 
communal buildings. These buildings are indispensable signifiers of a vigorous com­
munity for these villagers. In such a (critical/conflict-ridden) situation the building it­
self becomes a symbol. What is more, my impression is that it was primarily the build­
ing transformed into a symbol that finally divided the community, and thus its symbol­
ic nature was further fortified. The construction or the existence of a building mani­
fests the falling apart of a community and the birth of a new one, in other words the 
transformation of a village society.
What is this story about then? Individual ambitions, jealousies, onto which the 
external observer projects the conflict of identities? Was this really more than just the 
reshuffling of positions, the seeking of social roles? Or is this another proof of the fact 
that Greek Catholicism is very much involved in searching for its position, role and 
identity in East Central Europe? My investigations in the neighbouring countries and 
at home support the latter. The strongest Greek Catholic Church is the one in Hunga­
ry, because it was not proscribed, but her youth have had enough of the “Latinisation”, 
and the Second Vatican Council that opened the way for them to seek out their eastern 
roots, or in fact, it compelled them to do so: they want now to erect iconostases, cleanse 
their churches of sculptures, make their believers leave off their rosaries, "table-wor­
ship”. Priests of a pre-council mentality do not, however, think that if they continue to 
follow the old way with regard to relations with Roman Catholicism, they will lose their 
self-consciousness and give up their identity. Greek Catholics in neighbouring coun­
tries, on the other hand, very well remember how Orthodoxy threatened their very ex­
istence by claiming that with re-unification they would only return to their roots. Who 
are the Greek Catholics then: are they a bridge or a wall between Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy? What is their role in East Central Europe?
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